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This chapter attempts to unravel the complexities of 
resistance to, and collaboration with, the British colonizers 
of the Eastern Cape, South Africa, by the inhabitants of the 
Upper Kat River Valley. Since the Khoikhoi landholders of 
the valley had received their land as a result of British 
action against the Xhosa, and had generally accepted the 
precepts of mission Christianity, it could on the one hand be 
expected that they would fight on the side of the British 
against the Xhosa. On the other hand, they were subjected to 
racist attacks by the British settlers whose farms they 
defended, and by British officials. In addition, the ethnic 
distinction, on which the British acted, between Xhosa and 
Khoikhoi was more tenuous than they generally assumed. As 
a result, in the successive wars on the Eastern Frontier, the 
stance taken by the Khoikhoi was often uncertain, and 
finally led to a minority joining the Xhosa, and thus going 





The conflict between the Xhosa and the Cape Colony, along what is 
conventionally described as the Eastern Frontier of the Cape but which could 
equally be seen as the Western Frontier of Xhosaland, involved the longest 
series of wars in the history of Africa's colonial conquest. For almost a century, 
from 1779 to 1880, the region was wracked by successive outbursts of violence 
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in what has been called Africa's ‘Hundred Years’ War’.1 The violence varied in 
intensity and there were long periods of relative, even absolute, peace between 
those times conventionally considered to be war. Nevertheless, the threat of 
war, the experience of war and the recovery from war dominated the minds and 
lives of most of the frontier's inhabitants throughout the era, and certainly until 
after the end of Mlanjeni's War in 1853. This conflict clearly demonstrated that 
when the British Empire was forced to apply its full military might, it could not 
be contested by Africans. The conquest decisively led to the Cattle Killing 
Movement of 1857, the major breaking of Xhosa power.2 
 In the course of this contest, loyalties were never clear. It was never the case 
that there was an indubitable association between social position – ethnic or 
otherwise – and the political stance taken. Perhaps the only exceptions were 
some of the British who, imbued with a racial consciousness foreign (in the 
literal sense) to the shifting alliances of the Frontier,3 complicated matters for 
themselves and even more so for the rest of the Frontier’s inhabitants by 
attributing ideas and loyalties to others that they did not possess. For the rest, all 
those involved shifted their stance from time to time as the exigencies of 
personal advantage developed. In this chapter I discuss one specific case, that of 
the Kat River Settlement where, if the oxymoron is allowed, the murk and the 
confusion were even clearer than elsewhere. I give a preliminary account of the 
dilemmas faced by its inhabitants during three major wars which, in the first 
quarter of a century of the Settlement's history, affected the lives of the 
approximately 5,000 people living in the 800 square kilometres of the Upper 
Kat River Valley, and in effect doomed the experiment of the Settlement to 
failure.4 In order to do so, it is necessary to give a short description of how the 
Settlement came into existence, and what its place on the Frontier was 
considered to be. 
 
                                                 
1 C.C. Saunders, ‘The Hundred Years’ War: Some Reflections on African Resistance on 
the Cape-Xhosa Frontier’, in D. Chanaiwa, Profiles of Self-Determination (Northridge 
CA, 1976). 
2 J.B. Peires, The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing 
Movement of 1856-7 (Johannesburg, 1989). 
3 On the frontier in general, see the classic article by M. Legassick, ‘The Frontier 
Tradition in South African Historiography’, in S. Marks & A. Atmore (eds), Economy 
and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa (London, 1980); on the British, R. Ross, 
Status and Respectability in the Cape Colony, 1750–1870: A Tragedy of Manners 
(Cambridge, 1999), esp. chapter III. 
4 This chapter is as yet a preliminary discussion because not all the archival materials in 
the Cape Archives and in the Public Record Office in London have been fully 
investigated. 
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The upper reaches of the Kat River Valley receive rain with too little regularity 
to allow agriculture without irrigation, and thus lie just to the west of the 
ecological border of Xhosaland proper. Nevertheless, they were long part of the 
regular pastures used by the western Xhosa on a transhumant basis, and from 
about 1800 onwards began to be settled more permanently by the followers of 
Ngqika, the head of the Rharhabe. Ngqika himself had his ‘Great Place’ in the 
Kat River Valley, and Maqoma, his most prominent son and the most 
impressive Xhosa of his generation, came to live there. After the war of 1819, 
the area was part of the region declared neutral territory and effectively extorted 
(if somewhat willingly) from Ngqika as the price of colonial support in his 
struggle for supremacy over the Western Xhosa, and particularly his uncle 
Ndlambe. 
 Of course there was little chance that any form of neutrality would prevail as 
both the Cape Colony and the Xhosa attempted to claim the region. It was, in 
fact, marked for settlement by Scots highlanders but this measure was 
rescinded, as much because of personal feuds within the Cape government as 
for any reason of policy. Thereafter, in 1822, Maqoma came to settle in the 
valley, initially with the tacit support of the Cape government. There were, 
however, others in the government who could not countenance a Xhosa 
presence in the valley, notably Andries Stockenström (who owned a large farm 
just to the east of the Kat River), at the time Commissioner-General of the 
Eastern Districts, and a man whose official career at the Cape would be long 
and fiery. Stockenström proceeded to pick a quarrel with Maqoma, which was 
not difficult in the unsettled state of the frontier. In 1829, Maqoma was expelled 
from the valley, ostensibly for conducting a war-cum-cattle raid against some of 
the Thembu to the north.5 
 This expulsion was opportune and allowed the lands to be given to Khoikhoi 
in the immediate aftermath of Ordinance 50 of 1828, which had abolished all 
legal discrimination in the Colony suffered by free people of colour. Within 
four years, 2,000 people of Khoi descent had moved into the valley, and over 
the next decades this number would grow rapidly. They came from a variety of 
places. Many had been to some extent under the influence of the London 
Missionary Society (LMS), and many of these, though not all, had been resident 
                                                 
5 J.B. Peires, ‘The British and the Cape. 1814-1834’, in R. Elphick & H. Giliomee (eds), 
The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840, 2nd edition (Cape Town, 1989), 484; 
A. Stockenström, The Autobiography of Sir Andries Stockenström Bart, C.W. Hutton 
(ed.), 2 vols (Cape Town, 1887), I, 300-324; J.C. Visagie, ‘Die Katriviernedersetting, 
1829-1839’, PhD thesis, UNISA (1978), 34-36. 
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at missionary stations in the Eastern Cape, notably Bethelsdorp and Theopolis. 
Others came from the farms of the Eastern Cape, where they had either been 
effectively bonded labourers, or had a more independent status and more 
wealth, particularly if they were in some way linked to the farm owners by ties 
of kinship. Others again were living in Xhosaland but as they could claim to be 
Gona they were admitted to the Settlement.6 Many spoke isiXhosa as well as 
Khoi – a dying language by this time but still occasionally used in the 
settlement – and Dutch, and had often lived among the Xhosa at some period in 
their lives. This was not surprising, since whether a man or woman was Xhosa 
or Khoi was frequently as much a matter of personal political choice and of the 
accidents of individual biography as it was determined by descent. 
 The Kat River Settlement was thus born out of the conflict between the Cape 
Colony and the Xhosa. It was also seen by those who founded it as part of the 
bulwark by which the Colony could be protected from the inroads of the Xhosa 
in subsequent wars. Its inhabitants were effectively granted their lands under 
military tenure, that is to say the able-bodied men were required to serve in the 
British forces as a militia in the event, all too frequent as it turned out, of 
renewed clashes between the Colony and the Xhosa. 
 In retrospect, Stockenström was ambivalent about the value of what he had 
done for the settlers in the valley. On the one hand, he quoted a governor’s 
comments to him: ‘Well, Captain Stockenström [sic], if I were the creator of 
this settlement, I should fancy that I had done enough for one man’s life’.7 On 
the other, in the aftermath of the rebellion of 1851-3, he told the Cape 
Parliament:  
 
To benefit the forlorn remnants of the former possessors of South Africa, upon the 
basis of the 50th Ordinance, was undoubtedly one of my objects, but a secondary 
one. It was for the selfish purpose of turning the better and more efficient part of the 
[Khoikhoi] into a breastwork against an exasperated powerful enemy in the most 
vulnerable and dangerous part of the frontier that I decoyed them from those retreats 
where many of them were certainly not very comfortable, but where they were, at 
least, safe, and legally their own masters. By the bait of a speck of land in the vast 
territories of their fathers, I drew them into the slavery of constant watching, 
patrolling, half-starving upon ‘veld kost’, and the chance of any day getting their 
throats cut.8 
                                                 
6 Botha to Governor Sir Harry Smith, 23 June 1850, printed in J.J. Freeman, A Tour in 
South Africa (London, 1851), 183. 
7 A. Stockenström, Light and Shade as Shown in the Character of the Hottentots of the 
Kat River Settlement and in the Conduct of the Colonial Government towards Them 
(Cape Town, 1854), 14. 
8 Stockenström, Light and Shade, 5. 
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Within this context, questions of loyalty became of paramount importance. At 
least in the beginning the lines were clear. Those who lived in the settlement 
had accepted their land and their chance of a respectable life by virtue of the 
colonial expulsion of the Xhosa. Many had acquired their land as a reward for 
service in the colonial army. Others had been recommended by the missionaries 
and may thus be assumed to have chosen a way of life coincident with loyalty to 
the British. But such simplicities never last. Eventually a minority of the Khoi 
inhabitants of the valley joined the Xhosa in their fight against the British and 
proved to be among the most determined and successful of the resisters. The 
explanation for this volte-face, which the British themselves could not 
comprehend,9 lay in the combination of the impossibility of drawing a fixed line 
between the Xhosa and Khoi, the partial economic failure of the settlement 
partly as a result of its repeated destruction, and the assumption by many white 
colonists that the Kat River colonists were indeed disloyal or that they did not 
need to be treated with any consideration. Each of these processes became 
particularly apparent during the various wars of the settlement’s tortuous 
military history. 
 The wars between the Colony and the Xhosa were ultimately about land 
though also to some extent about labour.10 Both Dutch and, particularly, British 
colonialists were greedy for pastureland, and profligate with what they had, so 
always needed more. The Drang nach Osten was continual and the repeated 
assaults on the Xhosa were the results, in the last instance, of this pressure. 
However, the conflicts with the Xhosa and certainly the pressure on the Kat 
River Settlement derived as much from the animosity between black and white 
as from a crude desire for land. The deeper causes of that animosity may have 
lain in land hunger. Nevertheless, the viciousness of British settler hatred of the 
Kat River people was driven by the threat they formed to British perceptions of 
how the world should be, not by the hope of taking over what was admittedly a 
fertile piece of territory but which would have accommodated at most 25 
standard-sized settler farms and that was even more vulnerable than most of the 
Eastern Cape to Xhosa attacks. 
 The Settlement was involved in three major wars between the Colony and 
the Xhosa, beginning in the austral summer of 1834-5 (Hintsa’s War), in March 
1846 (the War of the Axe) and in the summer of 1850-1 (Mlanjeni’s War). In all 
of these battles, the Settlement was laid waste, most of its houses burnt to the 
ground and many of its agricultural improvements destroyed, at least 
temporarily. The majority of the settlers were required to abandon their 
                                                 
9 See for example, Sir Harry Smith to Earl Grey, 12 June 1851, British Parliamentary 
Paper (hereafter BPP) 1428 of 1852. 
10 In the case of the Kat River, labour played a minimal role. 
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dwellings and congregate in what can only be described as South Africa’s (and 
the world’s) first concentration camps, in conditions of great and frequently 
fatal hardship. They were set up by the British during the first two wars around 
Fort Armstrong, a position of natural strength in the centre of the settlement, 
and later at Eland’s Post, the modern town of Seymour. At the same time, most 
of the adult male population were enlisted into the British forces. Ninety per 
cent of the Kat River men fought in the War of the Axe, as opposed to 3 per 
cent of the white men in any of the country’s districts.11 They fought well and 
their arrival was primarily responsible for preventing the British army’s defeat 
at Burn’s Hill, when it had lost all its baggage. More generally, they, together 
with their regular fellows in the Cape Mounted Rifles, possessed the skills of 
irregular light infantrymen and cavalrymen which were needed in the bush 
warfare of the Eastern Cape,12 and which the heavily laden, red-coated British 
regiments singularly lacked. 
 
 
                                                
Hintsa’s War 
 
Despite the above-mentioned actions, the loyalty to the colony of at least some 
of the Kat River settlers was called into question, first during Hintsa’s War 
when they were falsely believed to be resisting the British forces. There were 
two reasons for this, neither of which were the responsibility of the Khoi. First, 
once the Xhosa had decided to launch an attack on the Colony, which only 
occurred in the weeks immediately preceding the invasion,13 their leaders, 
notably Maqoma, began spreading information that the Khoi had agreed to join 
them.14 While this was primarily designed to strengthen the resolve of their own 
 
11 Berkeley to Pottinger, 23 March 1847 in B. Le Cordeur & C. Saunders, The War of 
the Axe, 1847: Correspondence between the Governor of the Cape Colony, Sir Henry 
Pottinger, and the Commander of the British Forces at the Cape, Sir George Berkeley, 
and Others (Johannesburg, 1981), 89. 
12 C.L. Stretch, The Journal of Charles Lennox Stretch, edited by B. Le Cordeur (Cape 
Town, 1988), 55; Read to Kitchingman, 9 May 1847, in B. Le Cordeur & C. Saunders 
(eds), The Kitchingman Papers (Johannesburg, 1976), 8. 
13 Statement by the Rev. John Ross of the Glasgow Missionary Society cited in N. 
Mostert, Frontiers: The Epic of South Africa's Creation and the Tragedy of the Xhosa 
People (London, 1992), 653; depositions by the Glasgow missionaries James Weir, 
John Bennie and William Chalmers, by the Xhosa chiefs Tyhali and Bhotomane, and 
the Khoi Klaas Plaatje and Louis Arnoldus, in BPP 503 of 1837, 76-77, 80-83, 237-38. 
14 R. Godlonton, A Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes into the Eastern 
Province of the Cape of Good Hope, 1834-1835 (Grahamstown, 1836), 14-15. Here, 
Godlonton discounted the rumours as Xhosa propaganda; thirty pages later, 46-47, he 
claimed that ‘the fears [of Khoi disaffection] entertained at the time were perfectly well 
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followers, the chiefs knew that the rumours would soon reach the Colony and 
spread dissension among their opponents. This duly happened. 
 Second, these rumours were taken up on the colonial side by Captain 
Armstrong, commandant of the fort that bore his name. While he initially 
dismissed the idea,15 on 17 January 1835 he wrote to the commandant of the 
Frontier, Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Smith (later governor) of ‘an intrigue which 
is suspected to have been carried out with extreme subtlety between some of the 
people of the Kat River Settlement’ and the Xhosa. His argument, as he himself 
admitted, was based on a number of surmises and not on any observable 
occurrences during the first weeks of the war. The suggestions of Xhosa 
forbearance towards the Khoi were contradicted by the fact, as Armstrong 
admitted, that his prime suspects had lost property and had shot at least one 
raiding Xhosa.16 Rather the surmises are extrapolations from a number of facts 
in the past, as construed within Armstrong’s imagination. These were, first, that 
there had been considerable conflict within the Settlement in the previous year, 
in particular in regard of the government’s proposal to introduce a Vagrancy 
Ordinance; secondly, that the division between the supporters and the opponents 
of the Vagrancy Ordinance was conceived along racial lines, between the 
‘Bastards’ and the Khoikhoi in the Settlement;17 thirdly, that many of those in 
the Settlement were people of Gona extraction; fourthly, that the LMS 
missionary James Read, with his son (of the same name), had been active in the 
protests against the Vagrancy Ordinance; and fifthly that some of the Gona and 
James Read had both had regular contact with Maqoma in the past.18 
 The extrapolations which Armstrong made from these facts were threefold, 
and all very problematic. The first was that the genuine fear that many in the 
Kat River felt at the introduction of a Vagrancy Ordinance would manifest itself 
in rebellion against the British and allegiance with the Xhosa. Armstrong’s view 
                                                                                                                       
founded’; deposition by April, a ‘Bechuana’, 9 February 1835, Cape Archives (hereafter 
CA), LG 9. 
15 Read Jr to Kitchingman, 31 December 1834, in Le Cordeur & Saunders, Kitchingman 
Papers, 148. 
16 Armstrong to Smith, 9 January 1835, BPP 503 of 1837, 89. 
17 See S. Trapido, ‘The Emergence of Liberalism and the Making of “Hottentot 
Nationalism” 1815-1834’, in Collected Seminar Papers of the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, London: The Societies of Southern Africa in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries, 17 (1992); R. Ross, ‘The Kat River Rebellion and Khoikhoi 
Nationalism: The Fate of an Ethnic Identification’, Kronos: Journal of Cape History, 24 
(1997); E. Elbourne, ‘Freedom at Issue: Vagrancy Legislation and the Meaning of 
Freedom in Britain and the Cape Colony, 1799 to 1842’, Slavery and Abolition, 15 
(1994), 133-45. 
18 See two letters from Armstrong to Smith, 12 January and 14 January 1835, both 
printed in BPP 503 of 1837, 84-86. 
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on the matter was moreover jaundiced by the fact that he had put pressure on 
the Kat River settlers to sign the memorial in favour of the Ordinance.19 The 
second derived from his failure to understand the complicated politics of 
identity and language common on the Eastern Frontier, and indeed throughout 
Southern Africa. For Armstrong, as for most Britons at the time, one was either 
Xhosa or Khoi – the possibility of having dual nationality did not occur to them. 
The Gona therefore presented a problematic taxonomic anomaly. As Armstrong 
described it: 
 
The Gonahs are a race between a [Xhosa] and a [Khoi]. At one time the [Xhosa] 
took a number of [Khoi] into their service; they compelled the [Khoi] women to live 
with them. The children are Gonahs, entertaining partly a [Xhosa] and partly a 
[Khoi] feeling.20 
 
They were however ‘aliens’ who were illegally in the settlement as a result of 
Read’s intrigues.  
 There were many people in the Kat River whose personal biographies 
crossed the vague but hardening boundaries of the Eastern Cape and many were 
bilingual in Xhosa and Khoi. By the mid-1830s, if not much earlier, they would 
have added Dutch to their linguistic repertoire and were probably beginning to 
lose their Khoi. Andries Stoffels, for instance, the most famous of the LMS’s 
converts, first came into contact with the missions when he arrived at 
Bethelsdorp in the company of a number of Xhosa chiefs for whom he was to 
act as interpreter.21 Many of the Kat River Khoi had kin among the Xhosa, just 
as there were many with kin among the boers. The two groups were not 
mutually exclusive. In the racist22 vision of men like Armstrong, this made the 
former group suspect. It could, however, be argued that by leaving, or not going 
to live in Xhosaland and taking up residence in the Kat River, these people had 
made a conscious political choice as a result of which their loyalty to the 
Colony would be firmer, not weaker. 
 The third problem with Armstrong's analysis was the assumption that the 
contacts which Read and Stoffels, among others, had with Maqoma had to be in 
some way connected with plans against the Colony. In the first place, contacts 
need not necessarily have entailed conspiracy or incitement. In the second, the 
likelihood is that Maqoma's decision to launch the attacks were only taken in 
                                                 
19 Stretch, Journal, 88. 
20 Footnote in Armstrong to Smith, 14 January 1835, BPP 503 of 1837, 85. 
21 E. Elbourne, ‘Early Khoisan Uses of Mission Christianity’, in H. Bredekamp & R. 
Ross (eds), Missions and Christianity in South African History (Johannesburg, 1995), 
88. 
22 In the broadest sense. 
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December 1834, and there is no evidence that anyone from the Kat River visited 
during this crucial period. 
 The whole episode derived from panic on the part of Captain Armstrong, 
whom Read described as ‘the most timid man ever seen’, and who in the days 
around Christmas 1834 had to be restrained by the Kat River settlers from 
abandoning the Settlement entirely and withdrawing to the comparative safety 
of Fort Beaufort.23 He would not have been the only British soldier in the 
nineteenth century to take the credit where none was due, in this case for 
snuffing out potential rebellion by resolute action.  
 There was also considerable animus against James Read in colonial circles. 
His consistent non-racialism, both in theory and even more discomfortingly in 
practice, was always a potential challenge. It gave him contacts and friendships 
outside colonial circles that were at once an affront and a threat to both his 
fellow clergymen and to the white society in general. As a result, he was 
continually suspected of involvement in all sorts of nefarious practices, and on 
20 January 1835, together with the rest of his family, he was ordered out of the 
Kat River Settlement.24 He would not return for three years, although his 
absence was extended by a visit to Great Britain.  
 As Le Cordeur and Saunders pointed out some years ago,25 it should have 
been obvious that it was not in the interests of the Kat River settlers to join the 
Xhosa. They would have been aware that the main demands of the Xhosa 
included the restitution of territory, most notably the valley in which they were 
now settled, and which they were transforming into agricultural land by 
arduously digging irrigation furrows.26 
 
 
The War of the Axe and ethnic cleansing 
 
In the War of the Axe, no such implication of treachery in matters military was 
made and although the Kat River men were considered first-class soldiers, they 
were not treated as such. The distinction between themselves and the whites 
alongside whom they fought, was all too clear. They were not paid – though this 
was largely at their own volition so as to give them more command over their 
                                                 
23 Read to Philip, 3 January 1835, cited in J.G. Pretorius, ‘The British Humanitarians 
and the Cape Eastern Frontier, 1834-1836’, Archives Year Book for South African 
History , (hereafter AYB), 51, I (1988), 49. 
24 Smith to Armstrong, 20 January 1835, in G.McC. Theal (ed.), Documents Relating to 
the Kaffir War of 1835 (London, 1912), 27. 
25 Le Cordeur & Saunders, Kitchingman Papers, 149. 
26 D. Campbell, ‘Detailed Report on the Progress and Present State of the Settlement at 
the Head of the Kat River, District of Albany’, 7 June 1833, CA CO 2742. 
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own services.27 They did not receive clothing, soap or coffee;28 and their 
dependants’ claim to rations was countermanded by the governor, Sir Henry 
Pottinger.29 They did not receive their full share of the booty;30 and the governor 
tried to impose even stricter conscription on the Khoi at a time when there were 
in fact no men capable of service who were not already under arms.31 By 
voicing their displeasure at the treatment they received, they were accused of 
being in a state ‘bordering on rebellion’, and were only kept quiet by the issuing 
of rations they needed to stay alive.32 The racist assumptions of colonial society, 
perhaps fuelled by the Khoi success in the war, were being imposed ever more 
stringently on the Khoi. 
 In the years after the War of the Axe, the British administration of the 
Settlement became more intrusive and oppressive. For the first time, a 
magistrate was appointed to oversee the district, a position awarded to a 
confirmed enemy of the Kat River settlers, T.J. Biddulph. After protests about 
his actions, he was transferred elsewhere but his position was taken over by 
T.H. Bowker, a man of much the same ilk. Between them, they did much to 
alienate the Kat River settlers from the colonial government. 
 Paradoxically, they did so by measures that at first sight might have been 
seen to favour the Khoi. In the years following its foundation, considerable 
numbers of Xhosa and Mfengu33 had come into the valley. The most notable of 
these was Hermanus Matroos, alias Ngxukumeshe, the son of an escaped slave 
and a Xhosa woman, who had worked on a white farm in his youth and as an 
interpreter for the British since at least 1819. He fell foul of the Xhosa chiefs at 
the time of Maqoma’s expulsion from the Kat River Valley, and later was 
                                                 
27 Read to Directors, LMS, 23 March 1847, Archives of the Congregational Council for 
World Mission (LMS), School of Oriental and African Studies, London, Incoming 
Letters South Africa (hereafter LMS-SA) 23/1/C. They could also not be certain that 
they would actually receive their pay. In 1851, the men of the mission station at 
Bethelsdorp did not respond to the call of the civil commissioner that they again enlist 
because ‘they had been defrauded of their very pay by two of their Captains’ during 
their service in the War of the Axe. Port Elisabeth Telegraph, 23 January 1851. 
28 Remonstrance of the Council of Loyal Burghers, Philipton, 20 February 1851, in 
LMS-SA 26/4/A. 
29 Le Cordeur & Saunders, War of the Axe, 82-83. 
30 J. Read, The Kat River Settlement in 1851 (Cape Town, 1982), xiv. 
31 Le Cordeur & Saunders, War of the Axe, 77-92.  
32 Memorandum by Sir Henry Pottinger, Accompaniment G to Despatch 154, Sir Henry 
Pottinger to Earl Grey, 20 October 1847 (Grahamstown, 1847), 24-25. 
33 The Mfengu were Xhosa speakers, many of whom were originally from Natal, who 
had in effect chosen the side of the British in the long conflict on the Eastern frontier. 
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dismissed by the British, who suspected him of being untrustworthy.34 After 
some time wandering in the Eastern Cape, he received permission to settle on 
the Blinkwater River in the Settlement, even though he clearly did not belong to 
any of the categories for whom the land was reserved. It seems to have been 
largely his service on the colonial side during Hintza's War that led to this 
permission being granted.35 At any rate, by the late 1840s he was well 
established in the Middle Blinkwater as a Xhosa headman with four wives, one 
of whom had been a dependent of Maqoma’s,36 and with considerably more 
followers than the sixteen who had originally accompanied him. In the War of 
the Axe, he fought on the colonial side against the Xhosa, although his initial 
application to join had been refused by Sir Andries Stockenström who did not 
want him fighting against his own countrymen, and who had a long-standing 
distrust of the man who had managed to worm his way into the settlement. This 
decision was later overturned, but not to the extent that Hermanus was paid the 
money the Colony owed him for his services, as had been promised.37 
 The other Xhosa and Mfengu who came into the valley were less prominent 
and less independent but their relationship with the settlers was by no means 
uniform. Where the relationship between the settlers and the incomers was 
tenuous or competitive, the settlers attempted to have the newcomers expelled. 
There were petitions for the removal of illegal squatters in Fuller’s Hoek in the 
mountains of the south-west of the valley,38 and protests against the government 
allowing Mfengu to pasture their cattle in the Mancazana Valley. On the other 
hand there were many Mfengu who lived as clients of the settlers, herding stock 
and growing sorghum and maize on the commonage. The vagueness of the 
distinction between Xhosa and Khoi survived, as there were many Gona living 
around Buxton in particular, who seemed to have maintained a material culture 
which was largely Xhosa, but who were nevertheless clients, and often kin, of 
the settlers. 
 
The advice which the governor received from one of its officials, Charles Brownlee, 
was to send out of the settlement all [Xhosa] who had come into the settlement after 
the war [of the Axe] and who were suspected of having fought against the colony, 
whilst the Gonas and [Xhosa] who had resided in the Settlement before the war and 
                                                 
34 Bell to Somerset, 3 April 1829, CA CO 5111, cited in J.C. Visagie, ‘Die Kat 
Riviernedersetting, 1829-1839’, PhD thesis, UNISA (1978), 63. 
35 R. Godlonton & E. Irving, A Narrative of the Kaffir War, 1850-1851, facsimile reprint 
(Cape Town, 1962), 144. 
36 Armstrong to Hudson, 15 August 1837, CA 1/FBF 6/1/1/1. 
37 Stockenström, Light and Shade, 17. 
38 Read to Freeman, 31 January 1850, LMS-SA25/2/B. 
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had assisted in repelling and conquering the enemy should be promised farms either 
at Kat River or elsewhere.39 
 
In practice those who suffered were the clients of the leading settlers and the 
missionaries, the first being a number of Mfengu who were acting as cattle 
herders for James Read Jr and the Rev. Arie van Rooyen, a man of Khoi descent 
and originally from Theopolis, who had been ordained as minister for 
Tidmanton in the Lower Blinkwater a few months earlier. In September 1849, 
the civil commissioner of Fort Beaufort, N.J. Borcherds, who was shortly 
afterwards to commit suicide as a near-bankrupt,40 led a party of police to burn a 
number of Mfengu huts around Tidmanton, even though the huts were there 
legally and there had never been any complaint against these families from 
settlers living in the neighbourhood.41  
 This, though, was only the beginning. Through the first half of 1850, the 
campaign by the local officials of the colonial state against the residents of the 
Blinkwater Valley and later in the adjacent area of the Upper Buxton River 
became steadily heavier. They had, in their own eyes, reason for their actions. 
There were certainly considerable numbers of Xhosa who had come into the 
area since the War of the Axe and were squatting in Fuller’s Hoek and the 
Koems Valley to its north who were a threat to the cattle of the farmers in the 
Koonap Valley across the mountains. Nevertheless, the relationship between the 
officials and the Koonap farmers was too close for propriety. As James Read Sr 
wrote: ‘An Albany farmer will not do for magistrates for the [Khoikhoi], they 
are full of prejudice and will not rest until this is an English settlement.’42 
Certainly, Bowker had been levying fines upon the Gonas under Andries Botha 
(on whom more below) for what he claimed were stock offences, but had done 
so illegally. As a result, he earned a reprimand from the governor and was 
ordered to repay the fines, although he tried to put off doing so for as long as 
possible.43 At the same time there is clear evidence of corruption, of the use of 
office for personal pecuniary gain, on the part of one of Bowker’s subordinates 
at least, which further raised the level of tension.44 
                                                 
39 Read Jr to Freeman, 20 June 1850, LMS-SA 25/4/B; a copy of Charles Brownlee's 
report, dated 5 May 1850, is enclosed in Brownlee to Read, 22 June 1850, LMS-SA 
25/4/B. 
40 Read to Freeman, 29 January 1850, LMS-SA 25/2/A. 
41 Read to Freeman, 6 March 1850, LMS-SA25/2/B. 
42 Read to Freeman, 20 June 1850, LMS-SA 25/4/B. 
43 Freeman, Tour in South Africa, 190. 
44 A man called Cobb, who had been appointed in somewhat dubious circumstances as 
superintendent over the Mfengu of the Blinkwater, claimed land in the middle of the 
Tidmanton commonage as his own, and then began impounding cattle which strayed 
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 Whatever the motives, in the winter of 1850 in a week of rain, wind and 
even snow, a party of Xhosa police in colonial service, led by a British officer, 
proceeded through the western part of the Settlement eliminating the 
homesteads of those they described as Xhosa ‘squatters’. Their first targets were 
the Xhosa in Fuller’s Hoek and the other kloofs on the western boundary of the 
Kat River Settlement. Some were relatively independent or at least the subjects 
of Xhosa chiefs, including Bhotomane. One of the leaders, a certain Mali, was 
known to have fought against the colony during the War of the Axe. Others 
claimed to be followers of Hermanus but were living outside the restricted area 
he had been allocated. The party then moved on to Buxton where they found 
more squatters than in any other place among the followers of Field Cornet 
Andries Botha. The men, women and children were then shepherded off to Fort 
Hare, together with their goats and cattle. In total, more than 300 huts were 
burned, and 145 men, 350 women and an unknown number of children were 
driven off the land, together with nearly 2,500 head of cattle and 1,400 goats.45 
 There were many offensive aspects to this campaign. The missionaries, and 
probably many of the settlers in the Kat River, disapproved of the police 
continuing their work of destruction on a Sunday. The expulsion of men, 
women and children in the dead of a Cape winter without warning and without 
any real provision for their future residence was widely seen as brutal, harsh 
treatment, although it might be argued that, unlike Maqoma and his followers 
21 years earlier, this meant that they did not have crops standing in the fields 
waiting to be harvested. But, as he complained of the matter to his old 
commander, Sir Andries Stockenström, Andries Botha took exception above all 
to two matters: those who destroyed the houses, and those whose houses were 
destroyed. 
 The Xhosa police force had been formed in the aftermath of Hintsa's War 
and its numbers had been more than doubled during and after the War of the 
Axe. In wartime, the police had had a dubious reputation as spies and scouts, 
while in peacetime they were primarily engaged in the fruitless task of 
preventing cattle thefts and smuggling. Not surprisingly, both colonists and the 
other Xhosa distrusted them. At the outbreak of Mlangeni's War though, the 
majority took up arms with their fellow Xhosa, taking with them several  
                                                                                                                       
across the unfenced boundary and charging substantial fees to have them released. See 
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thousand rounds of ammunition.46 Most recruits after 1847 were probably men 
impoverished during the war. Certainly, relatively few had fought with the 
British then, unlike Botha, of whom Stockenström wrote: ‘Her Majesty has not 
in her dominions a more loyal subject, nor braver soldier’. The police relished 
the reversal of roles, shouting ‘exultingly’ – but probably in isiXhosa so that 
their officers, unlike Botha, could not understand when they said, ‘To-day we 
burn Botha out of the Blinkwater as he burnt us out of the Amatola last war’.47 
 Nowhere is it made clear how the police force decided who were squatters 
and who should be expelled. The boundary between Xhosa and Khoi was 
always vague, especially when Gona were involved. Botha himself was 
identified by the Xhosa police as ‘a Ghona Kaffir’,48 but a man with the office 
of field cornet, a regularly granted erf and a rectangular wattle-and-daub house 
could not be considered a squatter.49 It might have been that those whose homes 
were destroyed had made the mistake of maintaining a round, beehive-style 
isiXhosa hut. According to Botha, many were among his friends and perhaps 
his kin who had come to the settlement from Xhosaland in 1829. Those who 
had settled in Balfour had received erfs immediately, and some of those who 
went to Philipton later got land, largely in the Lower Blinkwater. However, very 
few of those who had gone to Buxton or to the neighbouring settlement of 
Wilberforce in the Upper Blinkwater Valley, a more pastoral region where 
irrigated agriculture had failed, had been granted title to land, and many had 
since become adults. As was commented at the time: 
 
They have always been expecting to get erfs, according to promise, but it was not 
done, and as they were among the friends, and no complaints, we did not urge their 
leaving; thus they have remained among their friends until now. They were ready for 
any duty, paid regularly the taxes as long as we paid, went on patrols against the 
[Xhosa], and fought two wars.50 
 
Indeed, according to a list drawn up by the Reads, of 36 Gona ‘burnt out’ at 
Wilberforce and Buxton, 29 had been in the settlement for twenty years, i.e. 
since its foundation, five since the 1835 war, one (whose name would suggest 
that he had relatives among the others) for three years and for one no period of 
time was given. There were also ten Mfengu families who had come to the 
settlement in the wake of Hintsa's War and six who had been policemen and 
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were afraid to reside among the other Xhosa who had entered the Colony in 
1842, in part because they had fought with the Colony in the War of the Axe.51 
There were also those who worked as servants for the Kat River Settlers, 
including at least one case where the labour contract, for a year, had been 
registered by Bowker only four months before the labourer in question had his 
hut burnt.52 The repulsion which Botha, as the leader of the Buxton and 
Wilberforce community, felt at what had happened is understandable and, 
though it is not expressed in the historical record, that of the younger 
inhabitants of the area was as great, if not greater. The fact that the inquiry into 
this affair brought Bowker a reprimand and led to his being replaced as 
magistrate of the settlement did little to mollify them.53 
 The pressure on the inhabitants of the Blinkwater did not end with the 
burnings and the dismissal of Bowker. A stream of complaints of cattle and 
sheep thefts from the farmers of the Koonap against the followers continued 
unabated. As a result, the government appointed a commission to investigate the 
matter. It was scarcely impartial. One of its four members was Robert 
Godlonton, the editor of the Graham’s Town Journal and an inveterate enemy 
of the Kat River settlers. Another was Major J. Blakeway, whose family had 
made the most vocal complaints against Hermanus and the Fuller’s Hoek 
squatters and who was believed to be attempting to buy part of the Fuller’s 
Hoek commonage. Nevertheless, at Godlonton’s request, the commission was 
accompanied by James Read Jr and the Rev. Arie van Rooyen.54 For six days in 
November 1850, they poked around the huts and houses of the Blinkwater, 
trying to find evidence of stolen cattle. One was even reported to have put his 
hand inside cooking pots to discover whether they were still greasy. One of the 
places which they investigated was a cattle post belonging to Oerson 
Magerman, a Kat River settler James Read described as ‘one of the most 
respectable men of the Blinkwater’, who, together with Andries Botha’s son, 
had commanded one of the Kat River parties invading Xhosaland during the 
War of the Axe. Magerman arrived while they were doing so and complained 
that his servants were being interrogated while ‘he was master of the place and 
would answer everything that might be asked of him’. This led to a 
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confrontation in which blows, or at least shoves, were exchanged.55 The 
incident can only further have soured the fragile relations between the settlers 
and the government.  
 
 
Mlanjeni’s War and the Rebellion 
 
At the end of December 1850 after a period of mounting tension, war once 
again broke out between the Xhosa and the Colony. It was to be the longest and 
bloodiest war fought in South Africa in the nineteenth century. To the Xhosa, it 
is known as Mlanjeni’s War, after the prophet whose doctoring was believed, 
erroneously, to give them protection against British bullets. This time, in 
contrast to the previous wars, a number of the Khoikhoi from the Kat River 
Settlement joined the rebellion against the British and fought alongside the 
Xhosa. 
 The trigger for the involvement of Kat River men on the Xhosa side was the 
defection of Hermanus Matroos. At some stage, probably after the assaults on 
the Blinkwater Xhosa in the winter of 1850, he had made his peace with the 
Xhosa chiefs and was privy to their plans to attack the Colony. He too began 
slaughtering his dun-coloured cattle, as Mlanjeni had ordered, sending their 
hides to the merchants at Fort Beaufort and to the shop in Tidmanton. His 
followers also did not cultivate that year, missing the opportunity to profit from 
the good rains.56 Certainly, he was aware of Xhosa plans to attack the Colony, 
which they did on Christmas Day 1850 after what they saw as an unsuccessful 
attempt to arrest the Ngqika chief Sandile. Thereafter Hermanus Matroos 
revolted too, although not until after he had been issued with guns and 
ammunition from the British armoury in Fort Beaufort.57 He collected all the 
men he could around him and forced the Khoi in the neighbourhood to join him. 
Deprived of their arms and with only 90 Khoi surrounded by 900 Xhosa, there 
was little they could do to oppose him. The Rev. Arie van Rooyen, the LMS 
minister at the Blinkwater, tried to persuade Hermanus not to impress the men 
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and sent messages requesting assistance to both the magistrate of the 
Settlement, J.H.B. Weinand, and Commandant Groepe in Fort Armstrong. 
Neither could spare forces to relieve or give assistance to the Blinkwater Khoi, a 
fact that was to exacerbate the spread of the rebellion. This message was carried 
by Oerson Magerman, the man who had been gravely insulted by the 
Blinkwater commission a couple of months earlier and who would later join the 
rebellion – although as yet I do not know under what circumstances.58 
 Hermanus began by capturing the fortified farmhouse belonging to W. 
Gilbert, who had been one of the Blinkwater commissioners, near Fuller’s 
Hoek. Then after a few days, he launched an attack on the British forces in Fort 
Armstrong. The British, however, were forewarned, largely because James 
Read had sent a message to the army that rumours of such an attack were 
circulating in the valley. Hermanus was killed in the streets of the town and the 
attack beaten off. Nevertheless, a number of those who had been pressed into 
accompanying him continued the rebellion, even when they had the opportunity 
to escape to the missionaries (and thus the British) in the coming weeks. 
 The rebellion began to attract adherents from outside the Kat River 
Settlement. Within the first week, considerable numbers of farm labourers and 
tenants from the Winterberg and the Koonap to the west of the Kat River Valley 
began to take advantage of their employers’ isolation and to react to the 
aggression which the farmers were showing towards them. There had been 
attempts before the rebellion begun to persuade the farm labourers in the area to 
join the rebellion.59 Indeed when the Winterberg farmers went into laager, their 
Khoi servants accompanied them but then went over to the rebels taking with 
them the guns they had received for the defence of the camp.60 By 2 January, 
they had come to the rebel camp in the Blinkwater, with some of the spoils of 
their actions. James Read Jr went out with one of his deacons to meet them 
there in an attempt to persuade them to leave the rebellion. He found that the 
camp was in a carnival mood. 
 
Now we saw the fatherlander sheep browsing – one slaughtered (sometimes two) in 
each house, pots boiling, meat roasting, and bread, cakes, and pancakes baking in 
abundance, while the whole scene seemed frantic with mirth and good cheer; and yet 
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there was a pensive but wrought-up solemnity – so characteristic of the [Khoi] – but 
which occasionally broke loose in unbounded laughter.61 
 
Nevertheless, there were a number of Khoi from within the settlement who 
joined in the rebellion, either immediately or later. The Reads, who saw the 
rebellion, correctly, as ruining their lives’ work, tended to portray the 
participants as giddy young men – not surprisingly as the young are always 
likely to be the most radical – while the loyalists were the established, 
respectable farmers.62 Statistically there is considerable support for this. On the 
basis of the Reads’ figures, it can be calculated that 22 per cent of those in 
possession of an erf joined the rebellion, as opposed to 45 per cent of the Khoi 
inhabitants of the valley who did not own an erf.63 The rebel erfholders, most 
common in the west of the valley where they had been pressed by Hermanus, 
had suffered most from government actions in 1850 and in general, they had 
been less likely to recover from the depredations of the War of the Axe. There 
were also many rebels among the people in those parts of the north of the valley 
that were laid waste by the British army and the white settler militias in 
February 1851.64 
 Such sociological comments cannot disguise the fact that among the rebels a 
substantial number of the established figures of the Settlement had joined the 
rebellion, and that others, including the two most prominent military figures, 
Field Commandant Christian Groepe and Field Cornet Andres Botha, were 
suspected of, at the very least, not being totally committed to its suppression.65 
There were a number of reasons for this. Certainly both Botha and Groepe were 
held back by the presence of one or more of their sons among the rebels,66 and 
the shearing loyalties of civil war in a close, small community must have been 
difficult for many on both sides.67 More generally, British settlers in the militia 
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and the British army were driven by the widely articulated belief that Mlanjeni’s 
War was a struggle between black and white, with no room for the greys (or 
browns) of the Kat River,68 and were unable, or more probably unwilling, to 
distinguish friend from foe. There were certainly loyalists who were killed by 
British forces in the belief that they must have been rebels.69 A party of loyalists 
from the Kat River was fired upon by the inhabitants of the town while 
escorting the magistrate into Fort Beaufort, exacerbating the anti-colonial 
feelings of those involved. These included Andries Botha, who exclaimed later 
that ‘he would join the rebels...take Fort Beaufort and convince the inhabitants 
that they had a different man than Hermanus to deal with’.70 Later, as General 
Somerset together with units of the army and the white militia swung through 
the Settlement, their forces took the opportunity to impose themselves on the 
Khoikhoi and the missionaries who had threatened their vision of the true order 
of the world. Some of the ‘Gentlemen Settlers’, as James Read Sr ironically 
called them, had marched up the valley flying a red flag with the word 
‘extermination’ affixed to it. The burgher militia burnt the houses and crops of 
the loyalists in Readsdale, Bruceton, Wilsonton and among the Groepes, for 
instance, as readily as they destroyed those of the rebels. The schoolhouses of 
the LMS seem to have been marked out for specific treatment in this regard, 
both out of prejudice against the mission and no doubt in protest against their 
potential role in removing the Khoi from dependence on the whites.71 Andries 
Botha, afraid of being lynched, spent several nights in the bush before giving 
himself up to army commanders, an action that was to lead to his being 
condemned to death for high treason.72 He was certainly not the only one of the 
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Khoi to take such an action.73 Though he did not condone all the actions of the 
men under his command, Somerset took no measures to restrain them. Certainly 
he accepted their ideas as to the responsibility for the uprising, writing in an 
official despatch that Philipton, the residence of the Reads and the main mission 
settlement,  
 
…so proverbially stated to be loyal, had in fact been the focus of almost all the 
disaffected in the settlement. ...I found, upon undoubted evidence, that from this 
body of people detachments had been furnished to support the rebels in their 
desultory attacks on the farms in the colony; in fact that the most disgraceful 
deception had been carried on to an incredible extent.74 
 
This sort of taxonomic lumping did much to drive doubters into the rebel camp. 
 All the same, the rebellion was driven on, in part at least, by a Khoikhoi 
ethnic consciousness that was certainly not called into existence by the actions 
and categorizations of the Europeans. As has been shown elsewhere,75 it had a 
history in the Kat River Valley that went back at least to the 1830s, and it was 
used to mobilize and justify the actions of the rebels. The Xhosa certainly 
played on it in an attempt to persuade the Khoi to join them. At one meeting, 
held at Sandile’s ‘Great Place’, the Ngqika chief proclaimed: 
 
I shall re-establish the Kingdom of Chama [one of the old Khoi chiefs, James Read 
noted]. Do you know of any of the heirs of the old [Khoi] dynasty? If so, I shall give 
my sanction to their again assuming the rank of their fathers. I see that 
notwithstanding all the assistance you have given the Government to fight against us 
in every war, and all your toil for the white man, you are still very poor... If you will 
join me, ....you may trust my word, that you shall be completed with cattle and all 
that a man should have; and farther, the first cattle that shall be taken will be 
distributed to the children of Chama.76 
 
The Khoi themselves articulated such ideas, for instance in two of the letters 
written by rebel leaders to urge others to join their cause. In the first, Speelman 
Kieviet wrote in the first days of the rebellion:  
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Our circumstances as the Hottentot nation...are now become very melancholy and on 
this account we have put our hands to a work from which we have no wish to retreat. 
We have done this without acquainting all of you who belong to our nation, and in this 
we have acted very improperly...but with this we take the liberty to acquaint you, as our 
nation, that we have commenced war with the settlers (meaning the English), and to call 
upon you as our nation to assist us. Break the bands of indecision or [sic] come at once 
with all speed to assist us in this great and important matter. Time is important. It is a 
national cause and can you as a nation remain inactive? Arise courageously and work 
for your motherland and freedom. ...The world is against us and who will be for us.77 
 
Five months later, Willem Uithaalder, commander of the rebel forces in the 
Amatola Mountains, had a letter written to Adam Kok III, Captain of the 
Philippolis Griquas, in which he called upon Kok to:  
 
Rise manfully and unanimously as a nation and children of one house to engage 
yourselves in this important work, a work which concerns your mother country, for 
not a single person of colour, wherever he may be, will escape this law. Trust, 
therefore, in the Lord (whose character is known to be unfriendly to injustice), and 
undertake your work, and he will give us prosperity – a work for your motherland 
and freedom, for it is now the time, yea, the appointed time, and no other.78 
 
For both Kieviet and Uithaalder, and for most of their followers, the nationalism 
they propagated was a very Christian nationalism, building on a long tradition 
of socially engaged mission Protestantism, which went back to the 
establishment of the LMS mission in the Eastern Cape. At the same time it was 
highly ethnic. Ethnicity, as ever, was a way to think about matters beyond the 
existential which it propounds on the surface, thus not just ‘Who am I?’ but also 
‘Why is this happening to me?’ The rebellion was explicitly not just an 
assertion of Khoi ethnicity: it was a protest against the threats of settler rule, 
which the Khoi saw, not unjustly, in the proposed establishment of the Cape 
Parliament. At one extreme there were those who hoped for the establishment of 
a Khoi state – a monarchy or republic – in the Eastern Cape.79 Those who were 
somewhat more realistic saw their protests primarily aimed at the European 
settlers in the Colony, and particularly at the possibility, which had been 
mooted by various of the farmers, of the reintroduction of measures that it was 
believed would reduce the Khoi once again to bondage, notably a Vagrancy 
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Act.80 The hopes and fears were enough to make them risk what they had built 






By the end of the nineteenth century, the whole of what was to become South 
Africa was under colonial rule. A couple of years later it was all under British 
rule. This is not surprising. British power was vastly superior to that of all other 
South African groups and when it was called upon it could, eventually, 
steamroller them. Moreover, the British, or at least some of them, had an almost 
teleological sense that they would master the sub-continent. It was a decision 
based on ideas of racial supremacy and racial difference, or at the very least on 
an ethnic consciousness which the British assumed for themselves and which 
they imputed to all the others with whom they came into contact. In the course 
of this process of ethnic labelling, they decided, effectively, who were to be 
their opponents.81 
 Matters seem very different and certainly more complicated when the point 
of view shifts to that of the non-British. As the history of the Kat River 
Settlement shows, the British perspective was usually based on an accurate 
assessment of the true motives and intentions of people to whom the British 
attributed hostility. Ethnicity, in particular, was not necessarily as evident a 
motive as the British assumed. It was not unusual for those who had thrown in 
their lot with the British to be rejected by them because of their association, in 
the eyes of the British though not in their own, with people who, at that 
moment, the British assumed to be their enemies. Many Kat River settlers 
rebelled because they were declared to be rebels, and even then many of those 
who were considered to be disloyal to the Cape Colony struggled as hard as 
they could to preserve their loyalty and to hold to the course they had chosen. 
What was called ‘loyalty’ was, in its way, just as much ‘resistance’ as was 
taking up arms. Loyalty was resistance to the increasingly racialized bifurcation 
of colonial South African society, while fighting, paradoxically, was an 
affirmation of that division. 
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81 For an analogous case, see S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances 
in Natal (Oxford, 1970). 
